Relocation of Publicly Supported Charitable Organizations by Goshien, Deborah C.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1970
Relocation of Publicly Supported Charitable
Organizations
Deborah C. Goshien
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Litigation Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Deborah C. Goshien, Relocation of Publicly Supported Charitable Organizations, 19 Clev. St. L. Rev. 316 (1970)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol19/iss2/34
Relocation of Publicly Supported Charitable
Organizations
Deborah C. Goshien*
S A DONOR POWERLESS to prevent a charitable hospital from moving to
another county after he has contributed substantially to its building
fund? Surprisingly enough, the answer to this question may be "yes."
It has been said that the community's interest is evident when
charitable monies come from direct public contributions,' and that even
if no trust is found a charitable corporation must use a gift for the pur-
pose intended.2 Yet general expressions of what "should be" or what "is
right" are insufficient guidelines for proper enforcement of fiduciary
duties, and there has been much confusion in the administration and
enforcement of gifts not in trust when a charitable corporation is in-
volved.3 Studies have indicated that the average state attorney general's
office has supplied almost no supervision or enforcement of charitable
trusts,4 yet the number of charitable corporations and charitable trusts
has been growing at an astounding rate.5
A recent Alabama case" contained language indicating the typical
thinking which is thwarting the public's ability to protect its interest in
non-profit charitable corporations. In this case a physician who was a
member and contributor to a hospital was refused the privilege of serv-
ing on the medical staff. This refusal in turn deprived his patients, many
* B.A., University of Chicago; Third-year student at Cleveland State University,
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
[Editor's Note: This paper was not part of the Institute held at the Univ. of Michigan
C.L.E. session.]
1 Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: an Unfulfilled State Responsibility,
73 Harv. L. Rev. 433 (1960).
2 4 Scott on Trusts (2d) 2558 (1956 with 1966 supp.). This doctrine has been well
settled since St. Joseph's Hospital v. Bennet, 281 N.Y. 115, 22 N.E. 2d 305 (1939),
commented on in Taylor, A New Chapter in the New York Law of Charitable Cor-
porations, 25 Cornell L. Q. 382 (1940). In the St. Joseph's case the testator had di-
rected that a portion of the residue of his estate be used for hospital endowment
funds. The hospital attempted to use the money for ordinary maintenance expenses.
The court found no trust but nevertheless found a valid, enforceable direction and
maintained that the funds must be used as directed.
3 Note: Gifts to Charitable Corporations-in Trust or not in Trust, 50 Marq. L. Rev.
671, 679 (1967).
4 Kutner and Koven, Charitable Trust Legislation in the Several States, 61 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 411, 412 (1966).
5 Professor Oleck has commented, in his article elsewhere in this symposium, that
in Ohio alone there were more than 70,000 non-profit corporation charters on file
with the Secretary of State in 1969. On this significant rise in influence of non-profit
corporations in the United States, see also:
Howland, The History of the Supervision of Charitable Trusts and Corporations
in California, 13 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1029 (1966), and Note, The Legal Framework Gov-
erning Operation of Modern Nonprofit Corporations, 47 Iowa L. Rev. 1064 (1962).
6 Moore v. Andalusia Hospital, Inc., 4 Div. 341, 224 So. 2d 617 (Ala. 1969).
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of whom were also contributors, of the benefits of the hospital. The
court's finding that the trustees' actions were within their discretion and
not subject to judicial review may have been appropriate on these iso-
lated facts. The court was, however, too quick to deny the public's inter-
est in charitable corporations which rely on public donations. The deci-
sion relied on language from an older Maryland case7 in which the equity
court was reluctant to interfere with the internal management of a hos-
pital even though supported largely by voluntary contributions.8  As
stated by the Alabama court:
... So, a hospital, although operated solely for the benefit of the
public and not for profit, is nevertheless a private institution if
founded and maintained by a private corporation with authority to
elect its own officers and directors. 9
A recent and rather shocking Illinois case"' failed even to discuss the
fiduciaries' possible breach of duty in moving an educational institution
to another state. A testator had left monies to Carthage College in Car-
thage, Illinois. The college disbanded its entire Illinois campus and
moved to another campus in Wisconsin. The court passed off this move
by saying that Carthage is a mere address, and that if the college has
decided to move, then it still deserves to retain the contributions." The
appellate court reversed the trial judge who had awarded the money to
another college located in Carthage, Illinois after invoking the cy pres12
doctrine. Neither judge discussed whether the gift failed completely be-
cause of the trustees' actions, seemingly conceding the trustees' right to
move the college.
In a New Jersey case, 3 donors to the Paterson General Hospital,
who were also residents of Paterson, failed in their attempt to prevent
the trustees from moving the hospital to another county. The court noted
that authorities were in conflict as to the extent a charitable corporation
is to be governed by laws applicable to charitable trusts.14 The court
also indicated that the standing of a plaintiff to complain should be liberal
7 Levin v. Sinai Hospital of Baltimore City, 186 Md. 174, 46 A. 2d 298 (Ct. App. Md.
1946).
8 Id. at 301.
9 Moore v. Andalusia, supra n. 6, at 619. Interestingly, although there is much sim-
ilar language, this supposed quote does not appear in the Levin case except in the
headnote of the West Publishing Company.
10 Bell v. Carthage College, 243 N.E. 2d 23 (Ill. App. 1968).
11 Id. at 26.
12 Id. at 27. Also see generally Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees (2nd ed.
1964) ch. 22, The Cy Pres Power, Sec. 431-442.
'3 Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hospital, 97 N.J. Super. 514, 235 A. 2d 487 (1967). [The
trial judge's opinion and a settlement reached while appeal was pending were both
approved in City of Paterson v. Paterson General Hospital, 104 N.J. Super. 472, 250
A. 2d 427 (1969)].
14 Id. at 489.
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because of the lack of supervision of charities in general. 15 Nevertheless
the tenor of this decision was that the trustees had full discretion to
make the decision to move without interference from these donors. Per-
haps the underlying reason was that the hospital was being moved only
a short distance:
Were it proposed that the hospital facilities be moved to a loca-
tion a considerable distance from the hospital's present site, we
would be faced with a different question, for there the community
to be benefited would have changed. . . . If the very basic changes
in the organization of Rutgers were found acceptable, surely the
relatively modest proposal we are considering must be deemed un-
objectionable.' 6
This case leaves unanswered the logically consequent question: "How
far is too far?" To answer would be obiter dicta, but our ignorance
awaits further case decision in the tradition of the common lawyer.
17
A similar situation exists today in Ohio where staff member-donors
of a Cleveland hospital are attempting to enjoin the sale of facilities to
a for-profit corporation and the removal of assets to another county.1 8
Ingleside Hospital is a centrally-located psychiatric hospital which had
been serving the Cleveland area. The trustees successfully solicited
funds from the public for a new building on the basis of the vital need
for psychiatric facilities in this location. 19 After operating for a few
months in the new facility, the hospital was closed after a dispute with
maintenance workers and negotiations were begun for a sale to a profit-
making corporation. In this case control of the seven-member board of
trustees was achieved through the use of extensive proxies. After much
newspaper publicity2 0 the Attorney General has intervened on behalf of
plaintiffs, but the outcome of the case is in doubt.
15 Id. at 495.
16 Id. at 492-493.
IT See generally, Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition (1960).
18 Florence Matthews, M.D. et al. v. Ingleside Hospital, Inc. et al., Cuyahoga County,
Ohio, Common Pleas Court case no. 873,358 (254 N.E. 2nd 923, 1969).
19 See exhibits A through E attached to Amicus Curiae Brief filed on behalf of the
Greater Cleveland Hospital Association in the case of Florence Matthews, et al. v.
Ingleside Hospital, Inc. et al. supra n. 18. For instance, Exhibit A is part of a bro-
chure mailed to the public during the building fund drive which stated:
Ingleside IS WHERE THE ACTION IS-NEEDED. The hospital is located on
the edge of the Hough Area, in the University Circle-Euclid Urban Renewal
Section. The mental health needs of the surrounding neighborhood alone, are
staggering. Not only will Ingleside provide a service which is desperately needed,
but also it will open up job opportunities where they are critically in demand.
We are happy to answer questions and discuss Ingleside's future with you, in
person. Please feel free to call us at your earliest convenience.
FUTURE PLANS. New facilities are urgently needed to keep pace with the con-
stantly growing demands for better and more extensive psychiatric care. Ingle-
side MUST build ... Now!
20 See 1969 Cleveland Plain Dealer files, especially March 2, 3; April 4; November 6,
19.
May, 1970
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Interestingly, under Ohio law, which is typical of much non-profit
law in the country,2 ' the Attorney General was not necessarily com-
pelled to join in the suit because of the ambiguity of the state statutes.
Ohio Revised Code Sec. 109.23 defines a charitable trust to include "any
fiduciary relationship.., subjecting ... the... corporation... by whom
the property is held to equitable duties. . . ." However, "Such sections
do not apply to charitable, religious and educational institutions holding
funds in trust or otherwise exclusively for their own purposes. . . ." A
building fund could be such a fund and come within the exclusion.
Under Ohio Revised Code Sec. 109.25, the Attorney General is a neces-
sary party to charitable trust proceedings if there is a departure from
the purpose of the trust. The problem at this point is whether certain
forms of donations to charitable corporations are construed to be char-
itable trusts.2 2 A 1958 Ohio case2 3 involved a testamentary disposition
to Bradford Junior College in Massachusetts in trust for certain express
purposes. The court found no "technical" trust, but
... the bequest to Bradford Junior College is subject to an en-
forcible obligation to use the money arising from the bequest, for
the express purposes named therein. In this sense it may be said to
have certain attributes of a charitable trust .... 24
In Ohio Society for Crippled Children v. McElroy,'25 a testator de-
vised his home farm to the Society to be farmed and used as a home for
crippled children. The syllabus of the court states:
Property given to a charitable corporation will be held by that
corporation subject to enforceable fiduciary obligations as to its use
only where the donor thereof expressed an intention to impose a
duty upon the corporation to use it for certain purposes and not
merely where the donor expressed a desire that the corporation so
use it. 26
Here the court attempted to distinguish between precatory language
and mandatory language, a difficult task.2 7 Arguably there is some basis
for distinction when a written instrument such as a will or trust docu-
21 Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations, Organizations, and Associations 13-17 (2nd ed.
1965); Bogert, Proposed Legislation Regarding State Supervision of Charities, 52
Mich. L. Rev. 633, 645 (1954); Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar
Association, Section on Corporate Banking and Business Law, Model Nonprofit Cor-
poration Act (Rev. 1964).
22 Note, Trusts-Gifts to Charitable Corporations-Nature of Interest Created-Duties
of Trustee, 26 So. Calif. L. Rev. 80, 83 (1952); Trustees of Rutgers College in New
Jersey v. Richman, 41 N.J. Sup. 259, 125 A. 2d 10, 26 (Ch. Div. NJ. 1956); Bogert, op.
cit. supra n. 12, sec. 324 at 671.
23 In the matter of the Estate of Bicknell, 108 Ohio App. 51, 9 Ohio Op. 2d 85 (1958).
24 Id. at 55-56.
25 175 Ohio St. 49, 191 N.E. 2d 543, 100 A.L.R. 2d 1202 (1963).
26 Id. at 544.
27 Bogert, op. cit. supra n. 12, sec. 324 at 666.
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ment is being construed. But when a person contributes a check in re-
sponse to either a general or a special plea for funds, he also expects his
gift to be used in a certain way although there is no written instrument
to prove his desire. This expectation may well be based upon impres-
sions garnered from the advertising of the charity and its statement of
condition to residents of the area.28 If the contribution is made to a large
charitable corporation, it is possible that the gift will be found to be ab-
solute and not enforceable by the donor.29 It should not be necessary for
a donor to a charity such as a hospital or school to write a trust instru-
ment or written expression of his reliance, yet the donor may not be able
to enforce the trust in any other way.30
Based on the above discussion of recent cases it can be seen that
today's donors must rely on the mercy and wisdom of the equity courts
because they lack a defined position from which to exert power to see
that their expectations are fulfilled.31 Yet it should not have to be the
function of the courts to superintend and administer charitable donations
and the courts have traditionally been unwilling to perform in the role
of administrators.
The reluctance and/or inability of states attorneys general to super-
vise adequately trustees of charitable corporations is well known.3 2 As
it stands now, a handful of trustees may have complete power over funds
which have been imbued with a public interest, and may even move the
charitable institution to a different community. This freedom in the
trustees has been possible at least in part because state actions have been
confined to the equity courts which necessitate a showing of abuse of
discretion. This requirement is most difficult to meet, since a decision
that is merely unwise will be found to be within the trustees' discretion
and not subject to judicial review even though the consequences to the
community may be severe. Also numerous jurisdictions have failed to
provide even minimal state supervision of charities,33 and of those states
that do supervise, only one, California, has adopted the Uniform Act
recognizing the need to treat all charitable fiduciaries alike regardless
of the form of the organization.3 4
If donees to charities have no control over their gifts, and the attor-
neys general are reluctant or unable to sue,35 then a handful of private
28 See Exhibits A through E, supra n. 19.
29 Bogert, op. cit. supra n. 12, sec. 324 at 668.
30 Kutner and Koven, Charitable Trust Legislation in the Several States, 61 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 411, 425 (1966).
31 Howland, The History of the Supervision of Charitable Trusts and Corporations
in California, 13 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1029, 1036 (1966).
82 Kutner and Koven, op. cit. supra n. 30 at 412.
33 Id. at 425.
34 Howland, op. cit. supra n. 31 at 1040.
35 Oleck, op. cit. supra n. 21 at 456.
May, 1970
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trustees may have complete power over funds which have been imbued
with a public interest.
Professor Kenneth Karst of the University of Southern California
has suggested a separate centralized state board to supervise private
charities, replacing the Attorney General and other state agency func-
tions.30 He is advocating a charities law distinct from traditional corpo-
ration and trust concepts. He has been echoed in this by Professor
Marion Fremont-Smith.3 7
Distinguished Professor Howard L. Oleck of Cleveland State Uni-
versity advocates a special S.E.C.-type supervisory agency, both federal
and in every state; not a branch of the I.R.S. This is included in his
Proposed Uniform Non-Profit Organizations Act.38
Other suggestions have been made,39 but the record of willingness
of state legislatures to act has been poor.40
There is an admixture of trust and corporate law in the law of char-
itable corporations because the charitable corporation is the product of
a change from the trust form to the corporate form and contains the ele-
ments of both trusts and corporate management. 41 Because of ambiguity
of both the statutes and former case decisions, it is not clear in any given
situation what the direction of the court will be and what place the
Attorney General will have in the litigation.
The most immediate problem seems to be the need for an exhaustive
interpretation of present ambiguously-worded statutes, and an expansion
of recognition of public interest in charitable corporations. The Ingle-
side Hospital case 42 and others like it, provide the perfect opportunity for
setting up guidelines to prevent abuses until such time as a separate
proper supervisory agency can be established. These cases will set the
trend by establishing the public's role in supervising charitable corpora-
tions and defining standing to sue, limits of fiduciary discretion and
proper enforcement procedures. Donors deserve clear indications as to
what the laws are and how they are to be enforced.
There has been some expansion of the right to sue. For instance,
36 Karst, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 476.
37 Fremont-Smith, Duties and Powers of Charitable Fiduciaries: The Law of Trusts
and the Correction of Abuses, 13 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1041 (1966).
38 Oleck, op. cit. supra n. 21 at 457; 575 et seq.
39 Comment: Selected Problems of California Charitable Corporation Administration:
Standing to Sue, and Directors' Ability to Change Purpose, 13 U.C.L-A. L. Rev. 1123,
1131-33 (1966) suggests a liberalization of the cy pres doctrine, broadening the power
to alter the trust after a prescribed period; Note: Gifts to Charitable Corporations-
in Trust or not in Trust, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 680 suggests that there should be a
presumption that gifts to charitable corporations are not in trust. Then if found to
be in trust, trust rather than corporation statutes should be applied.
40 Fremont-Smith, op. cit. supra n. 37 at 1042.
41 Note, The Charitable Corp., 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1168 (1951).
42 Florence Matthews, M.D. et al. v. Ingleside Hospital, Inc. et al., supra n. 18.
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Justice Traynor in a 1964 California decision 43 allowed minority trustees
of a charitable corporation to sue the majority trustees, reasoning that
the same rules should apply to both charitable trusts and charitable
corporations. 44 Justice Traynor in his typical forward-thinking fashion
recognized the difficulties of leaving enforcement up to the Attorney
General who may not be in a position to be aware of wrongful conduct
or to know the extent of the breach of fiduciary duty. He also pointed
out that other burdensome duties of office may tend to make the Attor-
ney General refrain from joining the suit except in cases of serious public
detriment.45 The older view is shown by the dissent which insists that
only the Attorney General may sue to enforce a trust assumed by a char-
itable corporation.46 In an earlier case,47 California had broadened its
rules of evidence to admit donor's declarations either before or after
making the gift to the charitable organization in order to determine who
should control the funds.
Conclusion
In allowing donor-plaintiffs, minority trustees of a charitable corpo-
ration and other interested parties standing to sue, the courts in these
recent cases have at least shown awareness of the public's interest in
charitable corporations. But this is of little value if, given the right to
sue, the donor-plaintiffs fail in their efforts to supervise or limit the trus-
tees' disposition of donations from the immediate community.
Until the individual state legislatures or the Federal Government
acts to set up an adequate supervisory agency, the courts must set guide-
lines on a case-by-case basis. Both family and corporate attorneys must
play an increasingly important role in making their donor-clients aware
of these guidelines and advising their clients as to what may happen to
their charitable gifts. When donors are solicited for building funds, spe-
cial drives or even general contributions to a charitable corporation that
serves a vital function in their neighborhood or community, these donors
must be made aware of the necessity for earmarking these donations so
that the funds will be applied in the expected manner.
43 Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 394 P.
2d 932 (1964). See also Note, Capacity of Charitable Corporation to sue Co-Trustees
to enjoin breach of trust, 16 Hastings L. J. 479 (1965); Wickes v. Belgian American
Educational Foundation, 266 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. N.Y. 1967), in which member-directors
of a charitable corporation were allowed to question the legality of a conveyance by
the foundation.
44 Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons, id. at 937.
45 Id. at 935.
46 Id. at 939.
47 Bank of America Nat. Trust and Say. Ass'n. v. Arakelian, 307 P. 2d 746 (Dist. Ct.
App. 3rd Dist. Calif. 1957).
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